‘Do not take the mother bird together with the young (22:6)’

Notwithstanding the above citation from the Talmud, both Maimonides (in his Guide for the Perplexed) and Nachmanides (in his commentary on the Torah) give logical and humane reasons for this mitzvah, and the similar commandment (in Leviticus 22:28) not to “slaughter an animal and its young on the same day.”

Maimonides writes that the reason for these mitzvot is so that “one should not kill the child in sight of the mother, for the animal has great pain from this. There is no difference between the concern of a person and the concern of an animal for their children, because a mother’s love and compassion for the fruit of her womb is not a function of the intellect or speech, but a function of the thought process that exists in animals as in people.

 

Nachmanides takes issue with this explanation, arguing that if that were the reason, it should be forbidden only to kill the young before the mother, not vice versa. “It is more correct to say,” he writes, that the reason for these commandments is “so that we should not have a cruel heart that is devoid of compassion”—since, in any case, killing a mother and its young on the same day is an act of cruelty. He also offers another reason: “Because the Torah would not permit a practice that could cause the destruction of the species, though it permits the slaughtering of a single member of the species.”

 

Both Maimonides and Nachmanides point out that their explanations seem to contradict the above-cited passage from the Talmudic tractate Berachot, which warns against explaining the mitzvah of “sending away the mother” as deriving from G‑d’s compassion on the mother bird. Maimonides also cites Midrash Rabbah, which states: “Does it make a difference to G‑d whether one slaughters an animal from the throat or from the back of the neck? In truth, the mitzvot were given only to refine the human being.”

 

Maimonides explains that there are, in fact, two opinions as to the nature of the mitzvot: a) that the mitzvot are supra-rational divine decrees; b) that there are reasons for the mitzvot, even if the reasons for certain mitzvot have not been revealed to us. The passage in Berachot, says Maimonides, expresses the first opinion, “that the mitzvot have no reason other than that they are the divine desire, while we believe according to the second opinion, that every mitzvah has a reason.”

 

Nachmanides takes a different approach, arguing that there is no contradiction between his explanation and the Talmud’s statement. The Talmud objects to explaining the reason for the mitzvah as G‑d’s compassion for the bird or animal; rather, it is to teach us compassion and prevent the trait of cruelty from taking root in our hearts. In the words of the Midrash, “the mitzvot were given only to refine the human being.” In this connection, Nachmanides also cites the verses (Job 35:6–7), “If you sin, how have you affected Him? If your transgressions multiply, what do you do to Him? If you are righteous, what do you give Him? What can He possibly receive from your hand?” The things that G‑d commands us to do are not anything that He wants or needs, nor are the divine prohibitions things that “bother” Him—He is above that all. The “reasons” for the mitzvot are the ways that they are beneficial to us, sanctifying our lives and refining our characters.

 

Prepared by: Devorah Abenhaim

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